especially with respect to direct-to-consumer genetic testing, where there is no consultation from a qualified doctor, or when minors are involved.
Introduction
Should I take a test of my genome or should I not? Do I really want to know my risk to develop breast cancer and could I cope with the high psychological burden? Could I profit from an early preventing strategy on the other hand? Do I have to tell my insurance company the results?
To answer these complicated and far-reaching questions many different aspects have to be taken into account. This review focuses on the controversial topic of the potential use of predictive genetic data in Swiss private medical insurances. It discusses the legal situation in Switzerland, the impacts of the regulations on individuals, research and the insurance industry, and compares the Swiss situation with other countries' solutions. Additionally, we question if the special treatment of genetic data is justified and if the disclosure of predictive genetic testing of minors and persons lacking mental capacity should be prohibited.
The Current Legal Situation in Switzerland
Swiss health insurance is divided into obligatory and voluntary insurance. All Swiss residents, regardless of nationality, must buy obligatory health insurance [article 3 (1) KVG, Bundesgesetz über die Krankenversicherung; Swiss Federal Law on Health Insurance]. Any services not included in obligatory basic insurance can be covered by additional voluntary health insurance [1] . In contrast to obligatory insurance, which is subject to social security law, additional insurance is subject to private insurance law (regulated in the Insurance Contract Act; VVG, Versicherungsvertragsgesetz [1] ) and, consequently, the principle of the freedom of contract [1] , i.e. an insurer can reject a request for an insurance contract without giving a reason.
As a result of enormous technical progress in genomics, particularly next-generation sequencing of human genomes and genome-wide association studies (GWAS), genome testing is now affordable to the wider public. Direct-to-consumer genetic tests (DTC-GTs) can be readily bought online, despite the current prohibition in Switzerland based on article 13 of the GUMG (Federal Act on the Genetic Testing of Human Beings), which states that only doctors are permitted to conduct genetic testing.
Generally, genetic testing can be separated into predictive and diagnostic genetic testing. In the latter case, genetic tests are implemented because of already existing symptoms. The firstly mentioned type of tests which are prior to any clinical signs raise generally more ethical, social and legal questions. Even though the difference is not explicitly mentioned in the GUMG, its scope is limited to predictive genetic testing [2] . According to Swiss legislation, it is at the discretion of every doctor whether genetic testing or a different method is necessary for the adequate diagnosis of an existing medical condition [2] . Therefore, the further discussion in this review will refer to predictive genetic testing.
To prevent genetic discrimination and to protect the right of informational self-determination, Swiss lawmakers adopted articles 26-28 of the GUMG. According to prevailing legal opinion regarding interpretation of Article 13 (2) of the Swiss Constitution, informational selfdetermination is part of the protection of privacy. It is, therefore, generally forbidden for insurance companies to request genetic testing of their insured (Art. 26 GUMG). According to Art. 27 of the GUMG, requesting disclosure of previously conducted genetic tests is forbidden in many types of insurance contracts and, most importantly, all social security contracts and life and voluntary disability insurance up to a certain insured amount [currently CHF 400,000 (approximately EUR 330,000) for life insurance and CHF 40,000 (approximately EUR 33,000) for voluntary disability insurance]. For other private insurance contracts that do not fall under Art. 27 of GUMG (e.g. private health insurance), insurers may ask for disclosure of previous genetic tests.
A potential applicant is, according to Art. 4 of the VVG (Swiss Federal Law on Insurance Contracts), obliged to inform the insurer about significant facts that are relevant for the evaluation of a potential health hazard. However, according to the proposed GUMG, potential policy holders are not obliged to disclose genetic information on their own initiative, instead only needing to truthfully answer questions from the medical officer of the insurance company [3] . Of note, there is a slight difference between the 'medical officer' in obligatory and voluntary health insurance: although the latter also consults with the insurer about suitable medical questions (Art. 57 KVG), they also undertake a number of underwriting tasks [4] .
The need to disclose genetic information is also dictated by a number of conditions. First, the regulation only applies to testing conducted by a doctor (because, as noted above, DTC testing is still forbidden in Switzerland and, therefore, its use is not regulated by law). It is unclear what the legal implications are of nondisclosure of DTCGTs and whether it could be considered deceit [Prof. Dr. iur. utr. Tag, University of Zurich, pers. commun.; 5 ]. On the one hand, DTC-GT results provide relevant information about the genetic predisposition of an individual, but on the other hand they may not fulfill the criteria for genetic tests that fall under the GUMG. Second, genetic testing results need to be reliable, technically and from the clinical perspective [Art. 28 (1) (a) of the GUMG]. Third, the scientific value of the test needs to be guaranteed for the calculation of the insurance rate [Art. 28 (1) (b) of the GUMG]. The intention of these last two conditions was to avoid tests with low validity being used in the underwriting process [3] , and insurance companies can ask the GUMEK (Expertenkommission für genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen), the Swiss expert commission on genetic testing of humans, for an assessment of a specific test [3] . Finally, doctors are forbidden from disclosing the results of specific disorders, and can only inform the insurer that the policy taker falls into a particular risk group [Art. 28 (2) of the GUMG].
While the insurance companies can ask for disclosure of previous genetic tests, it is clear that they are forbidden from requesting a new genetic investigation. The right not to know (part of the right of informational self-deter-mination) of the applicant is considered to be of higher importance than the interests of the insurance companies [3] . This regulation is in accordance with article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which allows genetic tests 'only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes', and not for the evaluation of risk.
Genetic Information for Insurance Use
According to the second annual report of the Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC), which was founded as a British Government initiative in April 1999 and ran until 2009, genetic data must fulfill three crucial criteria in order to be valid for risk evaluation by insurance companies: the data must be technically, clinically, and actuarially relevant [6] .
The risk of developing a genetic disorder is sufficiently relevant for insurance underwriting only under the following conditions. Firstly, they must be so called lateonset disorders; their onset is delayed until about middle age [7] . If they were to manifest in youth, there would be a preexisting medical condition that would need to be disclosed when applying for an insurance contract (article 8 of the VVG, the Swiss Insurance Contract Act). Usually, these kinds of diseases are inherited dominantly, whereas recessively inherited diseases manifest normally earlier in life or already at birth (e.g. cystic fibrosis) [7] . Secondly, they must have a significant penetration rate, meaning that the genetic condition finds an equivalent in the phenotype, clinical symptoms of the illness manifest [7, 8] .
In the UK, the use of genetic data in the insurance context is regulated by the Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance, introduced in 2001 (Moratorium) and 2005 (Concordat) [9] , reviewed and extended to 2019 (Moratorium) [9] . According to the Concordat, insurers are only allowed to require the disclosure of predictive (and not also of diagnostic) genetic tests when the insurance's cover is above a defined limit (e.g. for life insurance GBP 500,000, approximately EUR 638,000) and the test has been approved by the Government. Currently, only the test for Huntington's disease, a dominantly inherited single-gene disorder with almost 100% penetration rate, fulfils these conditions [7, 9] .
More widely, a number of disorders have been of interest in the genetics and insurance context over recent years. Whereas about 200 single-gene disorders are known, in 1996, Prof. A.J. Raeburn made a list of the most relevant single-gene disorders in the insurance context. He corrected it in 2000 [7] . 1 Three neurodegenerative disorders: the above-mentioned Huntington's disease, early-onset Alzheimer's disease and hereditary motor and sensory neuropathy 2 A degenerative muscular disorder: myotonic dystrophy 3 Four variants of cancer: breast/ovarian cancer, colon cancer (familial adenomatous polyposis and nonpolyposis colorectal cancer) and a cancer of the hormone system (multiple endocrine neoplasia type II).
Another important genetic disorder is the hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. It is the most common inherited cardiovascular diseases, about 20 genes are already known causing solely or rarely in combination with other genes a severe heart disease [10] . The penetration rate of some of the genes (up to 35%) is relatively high for a common disease [10] .
Besides these monogenetic disorders, which are quite rare, there is a second group, the complex genetic diseases, which involve more than one affected gene and environmental factors [7] .
Most of the time, the latter disorders (cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, Alzheimer disease, etc.) are much more common [7] . However, most of the common complex diseases do not have an influence on the underwriting process, because there are too many factors (several genes, diet, activity and other environmental factors) influencing the outbreak of an illness and can therefore not been taken into account for underwriting [7] .
Genetic versus Other Nongenetic Medical Information
The preceding discussion highlights that the use of genetic data in the context of insurance provision is more strictly limited than the use of other medical data. The question therefore arises of whether this is justified. Genetic information is considered very sensitive for many reasons. First of all, the information is (except in the case of identical twins) very unique, only a few mutations allow to identify a person, and it is furthermore fairly easy to procure, since DNA is in almost every cell of our body and can be extracted also from hair, saliva etc. [11] . Both facts constitute a challenge for data protection. Furthermore, in the past, genetic data had been misused to discriminate and stigmatize people, especially minorities and for eugenic reasons [12] .
Some argue that genetic data should not be taken into account when assessing risk, because the inheritance of individual genomes is random and cannot be changed or influenced. However, very few genetic conditions are so penetrant that they confer 100% certainty of developing a specific disease. Although a few diseases are inherited in this manner, such as the mentioned Huntington's disease, most diseases are multifactorial with environmental aspects such as healthy eating, physical activity, stress avoidance, and alcohol and tobacco intake influencing outcome. Second, while a family history of disease or poor health is related to our genetic health, they already form part of insurance risk assessment. Zimmerman noted that, based on progress in medicine and research, almost all health issues can be attributed, at least in part, to our genes [13] .
Whilst it is true that genetic testing can have an impact on other family members, it is also important to emphasize that family history is often a strong indicator of genetic disease. However, while the individual can actively decide to obtain genetic data, family history is usually disclosed. This does not, however, justify the special treatment of genetic data; on the contrary, if an individual decides to have a genetic test, one could argue that it is unfair to take advantage of the information by rejecting extra insurance. In contrast, while individuals with family histories can use the information to select insurance contracts, they cannot hide the information without infringing their contract. It is also important to note that, in spite of the excitement surrounding the genomic era, genetic prediction should not be given undue weight. Brandie et al. [14] compared family history and genomic screening in the assessment of breast, prostate, or colorectal cancer risk, and concluded that genetic data is not a substitute for family history, and, in fact, family history remains the clinical standard.
However, there remains a strong argument for the need for a 'special status' of genetic information, or genetic exceptionalism. If factors such as family history and previous medical tests are part of the actuarial processes within insurance companies, there is likely to be less demand for genetic testing, which has an impact on both the individual and society (see below). Nevertheless, it can be debated if private insurance companies must accept losses in order to offer incentives. Rothstein and Joly summarized the genetic exceptionalism debate as a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', since the more genetic data is discussed and viewed differently, the more it is considered unique [15] . Multiple factors contribute to the public perception of genetic exceptionalism. For instance, Rothstein [16] regarded the adoption of genetics-specific laws that might not be useful or needed in practice, but considered better than establishing no regulations at all, to be contributory to exceptionalism. Suter argued that it is the interaction between public perception, the media, the scientific community, and legislators that creates the 'allure of genetic exceptionalism' [17] , rather than merely media-driven or law-driven hype, or vice versa [17] . Regardless, genetics stories are emotive and benefit the media [17] . Finally, the amount of attention given to the public perception about genetics is also reflected in the amount spent on legal and ethical work on genetics; for example, 5% of the USD 3 billion Human Genome Project was spent in these areas [17] .
Children and Persons Lacking Mental Capacity
In Switzerland, Art. 5 (1) of the GUMG prohibits genetic testing without informed consent of the person concerned. Art. 5 (2) of the GUMG provides further clarification for people lacking the capacity to consent that their legal representative must consent to the test. Nevertheless, the best interests of a child limit the competence of representation [18] . Art. 10 (2) clarifies this position and indicates that genetic testing is only legal if it is necessary for the health of the child or if a severe familial genetic disorder cannot be diagnosed in an alternative way and the intervention presents only a mild burden to the child.
As an argumentum e contrario, Art. 5 (2) of the GUMG also states that the competence to judge is sufficient to give informed consent and a majority is not a requirement. Moreover, Art. 11 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states that children and young people 'may personally exercise their rights to the extent that their power of judgment allows'. However, in line with Art. 16 ZGB (Swiss Civil Code), the competence to judge requires, on the one hand, the ability to form an opinion rationally ('intellectual aspect') and, on the other hand, to act in accordance with this will ('voluntary aspect'). Therefore, the competence to judge must be examined on a case-by-case basis [19] [20] [21] . Since informed consent to a genetic test is associated with a high level of complexity and has far-reaching impact, the demands for competence to judge are, inevitably, high [20, 21] .
In both cases, either if the child, or his or her legal representative is capable of giving informed consent to a genetic test, it needs to be examined whether this data would become available for insurance underwriting. Whereas the power of judgment of children in this context might often be denied, parents must balance the advantages of a genetic test, e.g. possible preventive interventions or treatment against the psychological stress and potential financial burden of a more expensive insurance contract (provided it is not totally subsidized, see below) [22, 23] .
In 2013, the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) released recommendations on the reporting of incidental findings made during genome sequencing [24] . For example, they advised to report incidental findings of a positive genetic result for familial adenomatous polyposis (gene: APC ), familial medullary thyroid cancer (gene: RET ), or hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, all of which can manifest in childhood [24] . They also discouraged parents from analyzing the genome of their children in order to obtain information about adultonset conditions like hereditary breast and ovarian cancers (caused by mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 ) [25] . In Switzerland, this kind of genetic testing is prohibited, since it does not (immediately) protect the health of the child [26] .
However, the ACMG recommends not only reporting incidental findings of diseases that can manifest in childhood, but also to undergo preemptive genetic testing to discover such information [25, 27] , for example for several gene mutations associated with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy ( MYBPC3 , MYH7 , TNNT2 , etc.) that cause most sudden deaths in young people (under the age of 35) [10, 24, 28] and in which, sadly, sudden death is often the first clinical manifestation of the disease [28] . The prevalence of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy in the young asymptomatic population is 1 in 500 [10] . Genetic testing plays a significant role in preventing sudden death in young people with a predisposition to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy [29] . Another example is knowledge of RET gene mutations; the prevalence of all RET mutations in Germany is estimated to be 1: 80,000 inhabitants [30] . The RET gene mutations confer a high risk of developing medullary thyroid carcinoma and which would, ideally, also be useful in childhood [25] .
It could be argued that a tested child will find it harder to obtain affordable insurance than nontested peers with the same genetic risk. This could be avoided by forbidding insurance companies from requesting genetic information generated in childhood; however, this might incentivize parents to test their children's genome before maturity so that they do not need to disclose the information later. Due to this dilemma, the likelihood that DTCGTs will be legalized in the near future (probably under certain conditions) [31] , and the fact that lawyers are still debating the obligation of disclosure of such test results to insurers, attention has been focused on children and persons lacking mental capacity. It is becoming easier and less expensive to buy genetic tests online, which does not require full understanding of the surrounding issues and consequences. In particular, people incapable of judgment are probably not only unaware of the psychological consequences for themselves and others, but also the impact on obtaining insurance. To protect them from the effects of hasty or ill-informed decisions, it is reasonable to speculate whether disclosure of DTC-GTs of minors should be legally forbidden. GUMEK, the Swiss expert commission for genetic testing of humans, recommends that DTC-GTs on minors should be prohibited by law [21] ; however, in practice, testing abroad cannot be prevented. Nevertheless, this approach might create the wrong incentives: if disclosure of children's genetic data generated with the help of a qualified doctor is allowed, as it is at present, but the disclosure of genetic data from DTC-GTs is forbidden, minors might be motivated to use DTC-GTs. Since there is (currently) no supervisory authority or quality assurance for DTC-GTs, this is undesirable. Therefore, public awareness of the consequences of genetic testing might be a better alternative.
Consequences of Obligatory Genetic Data Disclosure
Since there is an obligation in Switzerland to disclose the results of genetic tests in certain scenarios, it might be that people are reluctant to undergo genetic testing due to the fear of high insurance rates [22, 23] . People have also been shown to refuse genetic testing due to a fear of genetic discrimination, particularly in the health insurance and employment contexts [32] . The consequences of avoiding genetic testing are twofold: first, patients do not benefit from preventative strategies, such as lifestyle changes or undergoing more frequent screening; and second, the lack of participation in genetic testing has an impact on others.
Marfan syndrome is a good example of the first scenario. Marfan syndrome is an autosomal dominant inherited connective tissue disease, but only about 75% of the patients have an affected parent, 25% being de novo mutations. To reduce mortality and increase quality of life, frequent cardiovascular surveillance to prevent sudden aortic rupture and ophthalmological tests are needed, amongst others [33] [34] [35] . In the second scenario, the impact of poor uptake is likely to impede research and further test refinement because less data are available. Different areas of personalized medicine, e.g. drug safety testing, which is connected to predictive genetic examination, could be fundamentally affected. For instance, about 4-30% of patients, including all patients suffering from coronary artery and cerebrovascular diseases, do not derive benefit from clopidogrel, an antiplatelet agent [36] . Although the reasons for this are multifactorial, a polymorphic CYP2C19 genotype may have a significant impact in clopidogrel responsiveness, since the pro-drug cannot be converted to the active compound in affected individuals [36] . Without knowledge of nonresponsiveness, patients with severe diseases do not receive appropriate treatment. The financial consequences for insurers and policy-makers due to disclosure of genetic data are discussed below.
Adverse Selection, a Risk for Insurance Companies
If legal prohibition interfered with symmetric information distribution, there is a change that insurance companies would have to bear extra costs, resulting in 'adverse selection' [37, 38] . Adverse selection describes the situation in which, because of asymmetric information distribution between insurers and insured, high-risk individuals buy insurance but low-risk individuals decline it. It should be noted here, that there is some skepticism, e.g. by McDonald, Hoy or Durnin, that it would lead to adverse selection and high impact on the insurance industry if it was prohibited to insurance companies to ask for the disclosure of predictive genetic information [7, 39, 40] . Nevertheless, they all come to the conclusion that it is very unclear how and to what extent this might change with further genetic and economic research [7, 39, 40] . Macdonald [7] makes an interesting comparison with different risk factors. According to him, banning the use of smoking status or sex in the underwriting process may not cause severe disruption for the insurance industry, whereas it is very likely with the age as a risk factor.
Subsequently, for further discussion, we assume that asymmetric genetic information might at some point not be negligible for the underwriting process.
Insurance companies not only need to avoid adverse selection out of self-interest, but also for the entire insured community [41] . Kubiak [41] asked whether this third-party interest should be taken into account from a legal perspective when evaluating private contracts between two parties; hence, whether third-party interest in an appropriate risk-based premium and the financial liability of the insurance company argues for symmetric information distribution between insurance companies and potential policyholders. Kubiak [41] suggests it can, since private contracts can never be considered in isolation but always in the context of other legal regulations and society as a whole. Furthermore, according to article 16 of the ISA (Federal Law on the Supervision of Insurance Companies; VAG, Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz), insurance companies must guarantee financial sustainability of their insurance activity.
Consequences of Information Distribution on the Insurance Market
The literature on adverse selection and the effects of asymmetric information on the insurance market is vast. It is often referred to the so-called 'equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz', namely that when insurers cannot distinguish between good/low-risk and bad/high-risk individuals, they end up offering a variety of products that allow them to draw conclusions from contract selection by the policy takers [37] . This results in a separating equilibrium (the opposite of a pooling equilibrium), where high-risk individuals pay a high but adequate premium because of the necessity for full insurance coverage, whereas low-risk individuals are underinsured because it is not economical: the probability of having a serious event that would need high-level insurance cover is simply too low to accept the high costs [37] .
According to Rothschild and Stiglitz, the separating equilibrium only appears when there is a sufficient percentage of high-risk individuals, whereas Wilson argues that even when the proportion of high-risk policy takers is small, there is equilibrium, either separating or pooling [37] . A separating equilibrium constitutes a Pareto worsening, i.e. the situation remains the same for high-risk individuals but worsens for low-risk individuals, who must accept underinsurance due to the small selection of suitable insurance contracts [37, 42] . The pooling equilibrium, which is much more probable since there is only a small number of high risks, is truly a lose situation for low-risk individuals because they subsidize the high-risk individuals. On the other hand, it is a win-situation for high-risk customers since they are offered cheaper insurance contracts [37, 43] . In the pooling equilibrium, the objective of affordable insurance coverage for high-risk individuals is reached; nevertheless, this outcome may not be efficient, since it not only represents shifting money from a 'stronger community' to a 'weaker community' from a genetic point of view, but also the outcome for the overall insurance economy is less positive. The total num-ber of insurance contracts will decrease, since low-risk individuals might avoid buying insurance [37] .
At this point again, it is widely unclear how seriously a prohibition of an insurer's request for disclosure of predictive genetic data would affect the insurance industry [7, 39, 40] . However, there have been many suggestions by researchers on how to react on a prohibition of the use of predictive genetic data for private insurance contracts. Hoy [44] and Crocker and Snow [45] argued that it should be solved by a tax transfer system, while Barigozzi and Henriet [46] proposed subsidized insurance contracts for high-risk individuals but preferred the solution of Tabarrok [47] , who advised that the government connects the legal permission of disclosure of genetic data to the obligation for genetic insurance.
Current Practice in Switzerland
Even though disclosure is legal in Switzerland, according to M. Pisan, chief underwriter of the Helsana Group, insurers do not currently ask for information about previous genetic testing. Moreover, they do not take advantage of voluntarily provided genetic data. Since this is also thought to be the current practice of the other Swiss health insurance companies, one company does not have to bear the risk of adverse selection, and the risks are distributed to all companies.
Comparison of Different International Regulations
Here, we discuss how different countries handle genetic data in private health insurance contracts and also more generally in other types of insurance, e.g. social security and life insurance.
Rothstein and Joly [15] summarized the most important international approaches to the use of genetic data in the insurance context. From the most protective policy to the most 'laissez-faire', six different approaches were suggested. (1) 'The human rights approach', in which not only is the use of genetic information by insurance companies prohibited, but also the use of genetic information in research and health contexts to prevent genetic discrimination. This approach is mainly adopted by Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey). (2) 'The prohibitive approach', which, in comparison to the 'human rights approach', forbids the use of genetic data only in an insurance context and not generally. Main adopters of this approach include Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Israel, while Denmark, France, and Portugal have elements of both the 'human rights' and the 'prohibitive approach'. (3) 'The moratorium approach', which, based on a convention, insurance companies are not allowed to ask for genetic data nor use it as long as the moratorium lasts, as used in Finland. (4) 'The rational discrimination approach', in which genetic discrimination is not banned when the use of the genetic data fulfils particular criteria, particularly scientific and clinical validity. In the UK, a 'fair limits (see below) and rational discrimination approach' is associated with a moratorium. (5) 'The fair limits approach', in which, above a certain limit (e.g. of insurance premium), the use of genetic data is allowed. Germany and the Netherlands combine the 'fair limits' approach with a moratorium. (6) Status quo, which is a 'laissez-faire' policy where there is no legislation forbidding the use of genetic information. A few Anglophone countries such as New Zealand, Singapore, and Canada chose this least protective approach.
The Swiss position is also quite complex. According to Rothstein and Joly [15] , a 'prohibitive and fair limits approach' is in effect: a 'prohibitive approach', because it is forbidden to use genetic data for social security, and a 'fair limits approach', because, due to Article 27 (1) (d, e) of the GUMG, the use of genetic data for life insurance contracts with an insurance sum above CHF 400,000 (approximately EUR 330,000) and for voluntary disability insurance with an annual rent above CHF 40,000 (approximately EUR 33,000) is permitted. The limits have been set in such a way that only a small proportion of insurance contracts are affected [3] .
From the authors' point of view, two further approaches are also adopted in Switzerland. With respect to private health insurance contracts, the 'rational discrimination approach' is applied. Article 28 (1) (a, b) of GUMG states unambiguously that the technical, clinical, and scientific validity of a genetic test must be proven to be used for insurance practices. Furthermore, in contrast to what is currently allowed legally, insurance companies do not ask for or use medical information. Since this is common practice and not just the policy of a single company, it would also correspond to the 'moratorium approach'.
The upside of this mixed model in Switzerland is that it includes the interests and demands from different market participants as good as possible. Uncertainty for patients, insurers and healthcare professionals on the other side is the downside of this compromise. This tendency to complexity seems increasing. The Federal Council reserves the right to undertake legislative changes at the level of ordinances [31] . Consequentially, not only public information is inevitable but also the regulation that genetic testing should only be implemented by healthcare professionals.
Conclusion
In Switzerland, it is legal for Swiss private medical insurers to ask for results of predictive genetic testing for underwriting, provided the test fulfils the necessary criteria, e.g. the testing needs to be conducted by a certified doctor. However, it is the current practice that Swiss private health insurance companies do not ask for disclosure of such genetic information. In this review, we further discussed that very little genetic information is relevant for insurance underwriting, and that even though being undisputedly sensitive information, the exceptional stance of genetic information must be questioned critically in future legislation. From the point of view of individuals and research, the obligation to disclose predictive genetic data brings more disadvantages than benefits. From an economical point of view it is very unclear if a prohibition of disclosure of genetic data would cause serious disruption of the insurance industry, and further medical and economical research is needed to evaluate the impact on adverse selection. It is therefore not possible to completely answer the question raised in the title of this review, but the current legal situation seems to be justified and future oriented.
Since Switzerland has, compared to surrounding countries, adopted quite a complicated model with regard to genetic data in the insurance context which is furthermore comparably 'laissez-faire', the wider public needs to be informed about the potential effects of genetic testing on their insurance, especially with respect to DTC genetic testing, where there is no consultation from a qualified doctor, or when minors and individuals lacking mental capacity are involved.
